Eva feder kittay biography channels
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Animals, Cognitive Disability and Getting the World in Focus in Ethics and Social Thought: A Reply to Eva Feder Kittay and Peter Singer
ZEMO () – samtal Animals, Cognitive Disability and Getting the World in Focus in Ethics and Social Thought: A Reply to Eva Feder Kittay and Peter Singer Alice Crary © The Author(s) Let me start by expressing my gratitude to Eva Feder Kittay and Peter Singer for agreeing to participate in this forum, and to this journal’s editors for proposing and organizing our exchange. For the sake of bekvämlighet, I refer to the essay of mine to which Kittay and Singer have responded, “The Horrific History of Comparisons between Cognitive Disability and Animality (and How to Move Past it),” simply as HH (For a summary of the essay, see above; for the full ord, see Crary a). My larger goal in writing HH was to describe, and to lay the groundwork for an appropriate response to, horrific ways in which—in many parts of europe and the Anglophone world—comparisons
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Episode 8:
Originally broadcast: September 13,
Modern political philosophy has argued that justice requires full equality for those who can both carry the burdens and get the benefits from participating in social cooperation. But what about those who cannot fulfill these obligations because of limited mental capacities? Are these people still due justice, and if so, what sort of equality could we expect to grant them? In other words, what do we owe to those among us who are not capable of participating in society in typical ways because of their cognitive limitations? These and other questions will focus the discussion with Eva Kittay, author of the highly influential book Love&#;s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. Does justice presuppose participation, and what happens when we shift the obligation from duty to caring for others? This discussion will get to the core of what we believe we owe others and what it means to live in a society where difference means m
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Speaker: Alice Crary (Professor of Philosophy, The New School)
Please note the change of location due to industrial action
What are we to make of the horrific history of the use of animal comparisons in rhetoric urging the marginalization, abuse, and killing of cognitively disabled human beings? Are there appropriate responses to this history that equip us to insist on the equal moral value of the lives of cognitively disabled human beings without simply re-inscribing the denigration of animals in our moral and political discourse? Is it possible to combine an image of animals as in themselves morally significant beings with a commitment to human moral equality? This paper offers an affirmative answer to this last question, and it proceeds by commenting on a conversation that took place at a conference, in the Philosophy Department of New York State’s Stony Brook University, on challenges that the lives of cognitively disabled human beings pose to generally held philosophical b