Slucaj spinoza philosopher
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Osloboditi afekte ili se osloboditi afekata. Slučaj Frojda i Spinoze
Releasing Affects or the Release from Affects. The Case of Freud and Spinoza
Subject(s): Early Modern Philosophy, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism, Psychoanalysis
Published by: Naučno udruženje Socioloki diskurs
Keywords: active state; conatus; contrary affect; death drive; façade formations; general indifference; madness; resolution; sustainability;
Summary/Abstract: In this paper, the author is questioning the very concept of indifference of thinking . The author also asks: in what sense thinking leads to overall indifference ? What, indeed, is indifference? Carefully reading the philosophical texts on affects, mainly Spinoza, Freud, Bergson and Deleuze, the author argues, that indifference is not a kind of non-affection, beside-affection, post-affection, but rather, it is a trace of affect just as cinders are remn
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Filozofija uma
Filozofija uma je grana suvremene analitičkefilozofije koja proučava prirodu uma, mentalnih događaja, mentalnih funkcija, svijesti te njihov odnos s tijelom, osobito s mozgom.[1]
Dualizam i monizam su dvije glavne škole misli koje pokušavaju riješiti problem uma i tijela. Dualizam je stajalište koje tvrdi da su um i tijelo na neki kategorijski način odvojeni jedno od drugoga. Može se pratiti od Platona,[2]Aristotela[3][4][5], te Sankhya i Joga škole hinduističke filozofije,[6] ali najpreciznije ju je formulirao René Descartes u stoljeću.[7]Dualisti substancija tvrde da je um neovisna postojeća supstanca, dok dualisti svojstava kažu da je um grupa neovisnih svojstava koja proizlaze iz mozga i ne mogu se reducirati na njega, ali nije distinktivna supstancija.[8]
Monizam je pozicija da um i tijelo nisu ontološki različite vrste entiteta. Ovu je perspektivu prvi put predloži
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Hana Samaržija
A Belated Failure: Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Contemporary Epistemic Conditiions
The Epistemology of Democracy,
Proponents of democracy's epistemic justification rely on Condorcet's Jury Theorem, commonly abbr more Proponents of democracy's epistemic justification rely on Condorcet's Jury Theorem, commonly abbreviated as CJT. In short, CJT stipulates two demanding claims. First, the majority vote among a group of independent, competent, and sincere voters, each of whom is better than random at selecting the correct option, is more likely to be accurate than any individual voter. Second, as the number of such voters approaches infinity, the likelihood they will be right verges on certainty. Conversely, I argue that voters do not meet these conditions in the circumstances of political polarization, the culture of ignorance, and strategic voting for epistemically defective parties. I first review three decades of research showing voters are woefu